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NCAA SCHOLARSHIP RESTRICTIONS AS 
ANTICOMPETITIVE MEASURES: 
THE ONE-YEAR RULE AND SCHOLARSHIP  
CAPS AS AVENUES FOR ANTITRUST SCRUTINY 
ABSTRACT 
By referencing the historical record to expose the NCAA’s one-year 
rule and per sport scholarship limits as cost-cutting, anticompetitive 
measures imposing harmful effects upon scholarship-seeking student-
athletes, this Note argues that despite the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Indiana’s unfavorable ruling in Agnew v. NCAA, 
a Sherman Act claim against the NCAA linking bachelor’s degrees and 
scholarships could be legally viable. In particular, just application of the 
quick look rule of reason, an abbreviated form of antitrust analysis, could 
lead a court to find the NCAA’s one-year rule and per sport scholarship 
caps as violative of Section I of the Sherman Act. This follows from the 
origins of the targeted scholarship rules in a horizontal agreement among 
NCAA members informed by motives of crass commercialism, not the 
romantic NCAA values of amateurism and the educated athlete. A court 
mindful of this legacy, and possessing evidence of the anticompetitive 
results that these rules have brought about, could fairly find the one-year 
rule and per sport scholarship caps to be illegal restraints of trade meant 
to boost NCAA member revenues at the expense of their student-athlete 
consumers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
With the filing of his October 2010 class-action complaint against the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (the NCAA),1 Joseph Agnew 
became the latest in a long line of disgruntled college athletes2 to seek 
federal court remedies for alleged NCAA violations of Section I of the 
Sherman Act.3 A former football player at Rice University, Agnew 
brought his claim after Rice’s newly hired head football coach declined to 
renew Agnew’s athletic scholarship4 in the summer before his senior 
year.5 Such a move was well within the bounds of the NCAA’s bylaws, 
which permit member institutions to revoke athletic scholarships at the 
end of each school year without cause.6 
                                                 
1 Complaint at 1, Agnew v. NCAA, 2011 WL 3878200 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 
10-4804). The complaint consistently cited in this Note is that which Agnew filed with 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California in October of 
2010. This complaint is distinct from the amended version Agnew brought against the 
NCAA in March, 2011 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Indiana—the forum in which the case was ultimately decided. See infra note 19 and 
accompanying text. 
2 See, e.g., Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998); Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 
1081 (7th Cir. 1992); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); In re NCAA 
I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (W.D. Wash. 2005); Gaines 
v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. 
Mass. 1975). These cases represent only a sample of antitrust suits athletes have brought 
against the NCAA since the 1970s. 
3 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); see also ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, 
MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 16–20 (2010); discussion infra Part III.A. 
4 The NCAA terms scholarships given to students in return for their athletic services 
as “grants-in-aid.” Generally, these grants may cover the “actual cost of tuition and 
required institutional fees,” but no more. NCAA, 2010–2011 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL: 
CONSTITUTION, OPERATING BYLAWS, ADMINISTRATIVE BYLAWS art. 15.2.1, at 196 
(NCAA ed. 2010). 
5 Katie Thomas, NCAA Sued Over One-Year Scholarships, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 
2010, at B16. Agnew’s story is a fairly sympathetic one. A highly recruited defensive 
back in high school, he accepted an athletic-scholarship offer from Rice University in 
2006. After a promising freshman year, injuries limited his sophomore campaign. When 
the coach who had recruited Agnew left after that season, Agnew found himself an in-
jury-prone player under a new coach who was uninterested in his services. Although 
Agnew won an appeal to retain his scholarship for his junior year, the new coaching staff 
was successful in terminating his athletically-based aid the following summer. 
6 NCAA bylaws allow member institutions to revoke athletic scholarships after the 
end of each academic year without cause. Bylaw 15.3.5.1 details the extent of a school’s 
obligation to its scholarship athletes: 
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After assuming, therefore, the unanticipated cost of one year’s tuition 
at Rice in order to earn his degree, Agnew turned to federal court for resti-
tution, claiming in particular7 his victimization at the hands of the one-
year rule8 that defines the duration of all NCAA athletic scholarships.9 
Asserting unlawful collusion by NCAA member institutions to create a 
rule prohibiting schools from offering athletic scholarships on anything 
other than a yearly basis, Agnew’s claim rested on the proposition that 
such cooperation amounted to an illegal price-fixing scheme: an agree-
ment to minimize members’ costs in competing for student-athletes by 
mandating price maximization of the bachelor’s degrees those athletes 
presumably seek.10 The one-year rule, in other words, by preventing op-
portunistic schools from driving up costs through competitively offering 
                                                                                                                         
The renewal of institutional financial aid based in any degree on athlet-
ics ability shall be made on or before July 1 prior to the academic year 
in which it is to be effective. The institution shall promptly notify in 
writing each student-athlete who received an award the previous aca-
demic year and who has eligibility remaining in the sport in which fi-
nancial aid was awarded the previous academic year (under Bylaw 
14.2) whether the grant has been renewed or not renewed for the en-
suing academic year. 
NCAA, supra note 4, art. 15.3.5.1, at 205; see also Sean M. Hanlon, Athletic Scholar-
ships as Unconscionable Contracts of Adhesion: Has the NCAA Fouled Out?, 13 SPORTS 
LAW. J. 41, 43–46 (2006) (describing the deceptive nature of the athletic-scholarship 
“contract”). 
7 Complaint at paras. 41–46, Agnew v. NCAA (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 10-4804). 
8 The principal portion of the “one-year rule” for grants-in-aid to which Agnew’s 
complaint objects reads as follows: “If a student’s athletics ability is considered in any 
degree in awarding financial aid, such aid shall neither be awarded for a period in excess 
of one academic year nor for a period less than one academic year.” NCAA, supra note 4, 
art. 15.3.3.1, at 203. 
9 Although this Note will make its case primarily by citing information pertaining to 
NCAA Division I athletics and the ways in which the member institutions of that division 
interact, it is of note that NCAA Division II bylaws also mandate the renewal of athletic 
scholarships on a yearly basis. NCAA, 2010–2011 NCAA DIVISION II MANUAL: 
CONSTITUTION, OPERATING BYLAWS, ADMINISTRATIVE BYLAWS art. 15.3.3.1, at 154 
(NCAA ed. 2010) [hereinafter “NCAA DIVISION II MANUAL”]. Meanwhile, member 
institutions of NCAA Division III, the NCAA’s least athletically competitive division, 
are not permitted to grant scholarships based on athletic talent. MURRAY SPERBER, BEER 
AND CIRCUS: HOW BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS IS CRIPPLING UNDERGRADUATE 
EDUCATION 270–71 (2000). For further discussion of the NCAA’s organization of mem-
ber institutions by athletic divisions, see infra note 69. 
10 Complaint at paras. 1–4, Agnew v. NCAA (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 10-4804); see al-
so Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 2011, at 6, availa-
ble at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-collegesports 
/8643/6/ (describing Agnew’s impetus for filing suit against the NCAA and the inquiries 
of the United States Justice Department into the NCAA’s one-year scholarship rule). 
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guaranteed four- or five-year athletic scholarships, instead had allegedly 
helped NCAA members maximize revenues by retaining the possibility of 
extracting tuition dollars from erstwhile scholarship athletes. 
Finally, Agnew’s complaint alleged an additional source of illegal col-
lusion by NCAA institutions11 via the NCAA’s mandated per sport scho-
larship limits.12 Agnew claimed that these NCAA-imposed caps on athlet-
ic scholarships for each NCAA sport supplemented the intent of the one-
year rule to reduce competition between, and thus costs for, NCAA mem-
bers.13 Specifically, the complaint asserted that these caps would frustrate 
competition14 by preventing ambitious athletic departments from offering 
as many scholarships as they had roster spots available on a given team.15 
The consequence, claimed Agnew, was to further increase the cost of a 
bachelor’s degree for prospective student-athletes16 by forcing some to 
“walk-on” to teams.17 Such walk-ons, without the benefit of an athletic 
scholarship, would thus have to pay their school’s full tuition.18 
Unfortunately for Agnew, when the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Indiana eventually resolved the issue,19 it showed 
                                                 
11 Complaint at para. 1, Agnew v. NCAA (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 10-4804). 
12 Although the NCAA permits both Division I and Division II institutions to offer 
their student-athletes financial support via “grants-in-aid,” the number of grants per sport 
permitted at Division I schools is considerably greater than that permitted at Division II 
schools. For example, in one year a Division I Football Bowl Subdivision team may grant 
up to eighty-five “equivalencies” (full grants-in-aid), while a Division II football team 
may apportion amongst its players only thirty-six equivalencies. Compare NCAA, supra 
note 4, art. 15.5.6.1, at 210, with NCAA DIVISION II MANUAL, supra note 9, art. 
15.5.2.1.1, at 156. 
13 Complaint at paras. 4, 28, 64, 67, Agnew v. NCAA (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 
10-4804). 
14 Id. at para. 64. 
15 For example, while a Division I Football Bowl Subdivision team has eighty-five 
athletic-scholarships at its disposal, it may carry up to one hundred and five practicing 
participants by the start of the regular season. NCAA, art. 17.9.2.1.2.1, at 262. 
16 Complaint at paras. 48–49, Agnew v. NCAA (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 10-4804). 
17 Although Agnew’s complaint does not specifically use the phrase “walk-on,” his 
complaint actually refers to the fate of walk-ons. For clarification of walk-ons in college 
sports, and for an example of a similar price-fixing claim that walk-ons have brought, see 
Complaint at paras. 7–8, In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 2004 U.S. 
Dist. Ct. Pleadings 1650 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 12, 2004). 
18 Complaint at para. 48, Agnew v. NCAA (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 10-4804). 
19 The NCAA succeeded, via a Motion to Transfer, in changing the case’s venue from 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California to the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. See Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n, No. 1:11-cv-0293-JMS-MJD, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98744, at *3 (S.D. 
Ind. Sept. 1, 2011). 
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little sympathy for his position.20 Citing Seventh Circuit precedent, the 
court declared the necessity of defining a relevant market in response to 
any antitrust claim against the NCAA, and in turn dismissed the complaint 
on the pleadings by concluding that Agnew’s asserted market for bache-
lor’s degrees was not in fact a plausible market.21 
Though mindful of the district court’s adverse response to Agnew’s 
antitrust challenge, the goal of this Note is to determine whether a similar 
claim could nonetheless be viable in a jurisdiction not bound by precedent 
to grant the NCAA the benefit of the doubt. Admittedly, a pessimistic 
response to this effort would be just; the recent Agnew decision was reflec-
tive of a history littered with failed attempts by plaintiff students to allege 
NCAA violations of the Sherman Act in federal courts.22 In particular, 
though courts have suggested that collusion among NCAA members to fix 
the price and availability of the NCAA’s output, college sports, could 
violate antitrust provisions,23 the courts have distinguished such “commer-
cial” activity from the formation of NCAA rules that advance the “non-
commercial” objectives of preserving amateurism, competitive balance, 
and academic integrity.24 Those rules, of course, affect student-athletes, 
who serve as necessary “inputs” for the NCAA’s product,25 and whom the 
courts apparently wish to protect from such evils as the “cold commercial-
ism” of the professional ranks.26 As a result, despite widespread recogni-
tion of the NCAA as a functioning cartel of revenue-seeking institutions,27 
                                                 
20 See id. at *23–30. 
21 Id. at *12–13, 26–30. For a discussion of the role of definition of a relevant market 
in antitrust analysis, see discussion infra Part III.A.2. This Note will contend that another 
court reviewing a claim such as Agnew’s would not be obliged to define a relevant mar-
ket, but could instead analyze the claim under the “quick look” rule of reason. See discus-
sion infra Part IV.B.2. 
22 Since the mid-1970s, plaintiffs have brought a great number of antitrust claims 
against the NCAA before federal courts. See, e.g., WALTER BYERS, UNSPORTSMANLIKE 
CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES 387–92 (1995). Only twice, however, have 
these courts recognized NCAA violations of the Sherman Act, first in NCAA v. Board of 
Regents of the University of Oklahoma, and later in Law v. NCAA. 
23 See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. 468 U.S. 85, 85 (1984). 
24 Matthew J. Mitten, Applying Antitrust Law to NCAA Regulation of “Big Time” 
College Athletics: The Need to Shift From Nostalgic 19th and 20th Century Ideals of 
Amateurism to the Economic Realities of the 21st Century, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 
4 (2000); see also Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 96. 
25 ARTHUR A. FLEISHER ET AL., THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION: 
A STUDY IN CARTEL BEHAVIOR 15 (1992). 
26 Tibor Nagy, The “Blind Look” Rule of Reason: Federal Courts’ Peculiar Treat-
ment of NCAA Amateurism Rules, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 331, 331–35 (2005). 
27 See FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 14; James V. Koch & Wilbert M. Leonard, 
The NCAA: A Socio-Economic Analysis, 37 AM. J. OF ECON. & SOC. 225, 229 (1978). 
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courts have largely deemed acceptable the NCAA’s collusive efforts to 
create rules that “preserve” its noncommercial values.28 Further, courts 
have assented to such rules even when, for example, the rules have served 
to maximize NCAA profits at the expense of student-athletes’ economic 
interests.29 
Despite courts’ justifications for permitting the NCAA’s monopolistic 
oversight of its student-athletes, the prospect of advancing a claim like 
Agnew’s intrigues in that it would threaten neither amateurism nor aca-
demic integrity. This is due in large part to its focus on the market for 
bachelor’s degrees, and thus its demand that the NCAA relax rules limit-
ing student-athlete access to a form of in-kind compensation30 that does 
not affect their amateur status.31 By describing college athletes as prospec-
tive students seeking a degree, and as consumers deserving of that degree 
at a competitive price, a bachelor’s degree-based complaint would stand 
against the NCAA cartel’s price fixing scheme without running afoul of 
the values of “amateurism” and “academic integrity” that have derailed 
past antitrust suits. 
By referencing the historical record to expose the NCAA’s one-year 
rule and per sport scholarship limits as cost-cutting,32 anticompetitive 
measures imposing harmful effects upon scholarship-seeking student-
athletes, this Note will argue that despite the ruling in Agnew, a Sherman 
Act claim against the NCAA linking bachelor’s degrees and scholarships 
could be legally viable. Parts I, II, and III will set a foundation by discuss-
ing respectively the evolution of the NCAA into a cartel, the existence of 
athletic scholarship rules as a product of cartel behavior, and the federal 
courts’ treatment of the NCAA cartel in the face of past antitrust chal-
                                                                                                                         
Koch defines a “cartel” as “a group of independent firms attempting, via collusive 
agreement, to behave as a collective monopoly.” Id. at 229. See generally Craig A. 
Depken & Dennis P. Wilson, The Impact of Cartel Enforcement in NCAA Division I-A 
Football, in ECONOMICS OF COLLEGE SPORTS (John Fizel & Rodney Forts eds., 2004). 
28 Matthew J. Mitten, University Price Competition for Elite Students and Athletes: 
Illusions and Realities, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 59, 62–63 (1995). 
29 See Nagy, supra note 26, at 331–35. 
30 See MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE SPORTS INC.: THE ATHLETIC DEPARTMENT VS. 
THE UNIVERSITY 208 (1990) (noting that college athletes sell their talents as sports enter-
tainers in exchange for athletic scholarships). 
31 See BYERS, supra note 22, at 72 (explaining the NCAA’s rationale, upon associa-
tion-wide institution of the athletic-scholarship in 1956, that an athlete remained a true 
amateur if he received from his school only “commonly accepted educational expenses”). 
32 See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, THE BOTTOM LINE: OBSERVATIONS AND ARGUMENTS ON 
THE SPORTS BUSINESS 234 (2006) (observing that “[t]he NCAA gets in trouble [with the 
courts] when its regulations are designed to reduce the costs of operating an athletic 
program”). 
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lenges. Part IV will explain how just application of the quick look rule of 
reason, an abbreviated form of antitrust analysis, could lead a court to find 
the NCAA’s one-year rule and per sport scholarship caps as violative of 
Section I of the Sherman Act. Fundamentally, this Note will show the 
targeted scholarship rules to be products of a horizontal agreement among 
NCAA members informed by motives of crass commercialism, not the 
romantic NCAA values of amateurism and the educated athlete. A court 
mindful of this legacy, and possessing evidence of the anticompetitive 
results that these rules have brought about, could fairly find the one-year 
rule and per sport scholarship caps to be illegal restraints of trade33 meant 
to boost NCAA member revenues at the expense of their student-athlete 
consumers. 
I. THE NCAA: INFORMAL ASSOCIATION TO BUSINESS-ORIENTED CARTEL 
Article I of the NCAA Constitution, which offers an articulation of the 
NCAA’s “basic purpose,” would not be supportive of an antitrust claim’s 
implication that the NCAA concerns itself with commercially-focused 
activities, much less the restraint of trade.34 It offers no mention of input 
or output markets, and no discussion of revenues or the centrality of a 
commercial agenda. It articulates instead the values of academics and 
amateurism,35 the very principles federal courts have often cited in waving 
away student plaintiffs’ claims of NCAA antitrust violations.36 Although 
such principles are admirable, and while they may yet have a place in 
informing NCAA policies and rules, they strike an odd contrast with a 
statement on the NCAA’s website, under a heading of “Commercialism,” 
which reads: “[T]he NCAA maintains that ‘amateur’ describes intercolle-
giate athletics participants, not the enterprise.”37 There appears to be, in 
other words, a place in the NCAA reserved for “relationships with corpo-
                                                 
33 See ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 
IN A NUTSHELL 8–9 (1994) (defining “restraint of trade,” and discussing the point at 
which an ordinary business transaction becomes a deleterious restraint of trade). 
34 See, e.g., NCAA, supra note 4, art. 1.2, at 1. 
35 Article 1.3.1 of the NCAA Constitution reads, in part: “A basic purpose of this As-
sociation is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational 
program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a 
clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.” Id. 
art. 1.3.1, at 1. 
36 See Nagy, supra note 26, at 334. 
37 Commercialism, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCA 
A/Issues/Commercialism/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2012). 
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rate entities” and “revenue-generating sports,”38 commercial elements that 
are acceptable so long as their influence does not tarnish the amateur sta-
tus of the students who play the games. In this way, the NCAA leads a 
“schizophrenic existence,”39 negotiating on one hand a fourteen-year, 
$10.8 billion contract with CBS and Time Warner to televise its Men’s 
Basketball Tournament,40 and on the other claiming that the resulting 
average yearly intake of $77 million will function entirely to support the 
non-commercial goals of amateurism and academics. 
To be sure, the NCAA’s origins did not involve the same overwhel-
mingly commercial orientation and savvy.41 With the passage of the twen-
tieth century, however, the rise in popularity of college sports, especially 
football and men’s basketball, saw the NCAA grow to become the mana-
gerial hub of the college sports business: a business-oriented cartel of 
member institutions making rules as much in aid of economic interests as 
the principles of amateurism and academic integrity.42 
A. The NCAA Originally: Formation and the Amateur Ideal 
The NCAA arose primarily as President Theodore Roosevelt’s re-
sponse to the rising number of deaths and serious injuries in early-
twentieth century college football.43 Specifically, it was the President’s 
admonition of certain Ivy League officials, whose football contests had 
been responsible for eighteen deaths in 1905, which helped prompt the 
creation of the NCAA the following year.44 The new association, however, 
was not to have the enforcement and revenue-producing responsibilities 
that it currently maintains.45 Rather, as reflective of Roosevelt’s concerns, 
it was to function as a regulatory body for college football, and its specific 
purpose was to develop and standardize rules of the game to stem the 
                                                 
38 Id. 
39 See ZIMBALIST, supra note 32, at 240. 
40 Curtis Eichelburger, NCAA Says Sports Revenue Growth Won’t Exceed Three Per-
cent at Biggest Schools in U.S., BLOOMBERG, Dec. 29, 2010, available at http://www 
.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-29/ncaa-says-sports-revenue-growth-won-t-exceed-3-at-
biggest-schools-in-u-s-.html. 
41 BYERS, supra note 22, at 37–38 (quoting President Roosevelt, saying of college 
football: “It is first-class, healthful play, and is useful as such. But play is not busi-
ness...”). 
42 See generally ZIMBALIST, supra note 32, at 235–37. 
43 See BYERS, supra note 22, at 38–39. 
44 Id. 
45 See Craig A. Depken & Dennis P. Wilson, Institutional Change in the NCAA and 
Competitive Balance in Intercollegiate Football, in ECONOMICS OF COLLEGE SPORTS 
203–05 (John Fizel & Rodney Fort eds., 2004). 
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alarming rise in casualties of its participants.46 In this way, the NCAA 
became a loosely tied, voluntary association of a small number of schools 
seeking to provide uniform on-field rules for a particularly dangerous 
game.47 Accompanying this purpose, though, was a now familiar-sounding 
principle, as declared by Roosevelt, that “no student shall represent a col-
lege or university in any intercollegiate game ... who has at any time re-
ceived ... money, or any other consideration.”48 Whether NCAA member 
schools at the time took to heart Roosevelt’s insistence on amateurism in 
the college game is another story.49 Nonetheless, the principle had been 
expressed, its association with the NCAA affirmed by the President’s 
words, and its message made available for posterity to claim as part of the 
NCAA’s legacy. 
B. The NCAA Evolves: Centralization and Enforcement 
Although college football, and thus the NCAA, grew dramatically 
through the first four-and-a-half decades after the NCAA’s founding,50 the 
NCAA’s influence over college sports, and over football in particular, did 
not extend far beyond its occasional propagation of amateurism-informed 
regulations regarding the eligibility and compensation of college ath-
letes.51 Yet because the NCAA had no mechanism through which it could 
enforce these rules, schools generally operated as they wished, particularly 
regarding compensation; the schools devised and carried out whatever 
compensatory means they preferred to attract talented athletes to their 
                                                 
46 Id. 
47 See Depken & Wilson, supra note 27, at 226. It is of note that upon its founding, 
the NCAA, made up primarily of faculty representatives from member schools, imme-
diately developed additional regulations addressing issues such as athletes’ eligibility, 
rules regarding transfers, and amateurism. It would not, however, adopt any mechanisms 
to enforce these regulations for another forty-plus years. Nevertheless, Fleisher characte-
rizes the NCAA’s development of these early regulations as an initial foray into the 
cartelization, defined by restraints on student-athletes as “inputs,” that today defines its 
behavior. FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 41–42. 
48 See BYERS, supra note 22, at 40. 
49 See id. at 40, 65. Byers notes, for example, that during the 1930s and early 1940s, 
“it was not uncommon for an alumnus to adopt a local high school athlete and ‘put him 
through college.’” Id. at 40, 65; see also FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 42. 
50 Fleisher describes the period from 1920 to 1940 as college football’s “golden age,” 
as the era “witnessed the expansion of college athletics from a small cottage industry into 
a nationwide preoccupation.” FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 42. 
51 See id. at 44–45. 
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campuses.52 This changed, however, in the period from 1946 to 1953, 
when initiatives on the part of the NCAA’s most influential members saw 
the once loosely bound, voluntary association transform into an effective, 
rules-wielding cartel.53 
A new wave of rhetoric inspired this transition, espousing a renewed 
concern for amateurism in college sports—the old stand-by principle of 
the NCAA that college football had generally neglected to recognize 
through much of its history.54 This concern arose with the return of Amer-
ica’s World War II veterans in 1945, a massive crop of potential student-
athletes eager for college degrees in response to the implementation of the 
G.I. Bill of Rights.55 What followed was a recruiting free-for-all, as ambi-
tious athletic programs looking to insert themselves into the scene of top-
flight college football began offering whatever financial inducements they 
could to incorporate the new talent into their programs.56 
Responding principally to these aggressive and increasingly expensive 
recruiting tactics was college football’s entrenched elite, particularly the 
members of the tradition-rich Big Ten Conference.57 Trumpeting the val-
ues of amateurism, but likely more concerned with the escalating costs of 
athlete recruitment,58 leaders from The Big Ten and several other promi-
nent NCAA football conferences convened in 1946 to draft the “Principles 
of Conduct of Intercollegiate Athletics” (the Principles).59 At the core of 
this document was its emphasis on the “amateur ideal” of the college ath-
lete, and thus a corresponding insistence that financial aid to athletic re-
                                                 
52 See id. at 46. The NCAA was, by one account, “a singularly toothless organization 
that contented itself with vague resolutions commending amateurism.” MURRAY 
SPERBER, ONWARD TO VICTORY: THE CRISES THAT SHAPED COLLEGE SPORTS 171 
(1998). 
53 See FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 46. 
54 Id. at 42–46. 
55 The G.I. Bill of Rights, providing “government funding for all former [military] 
service personnel wishing to attend university,” inspired the enrollment in post-secondary 
educational institutions of many Americans who would have otherwise never considered 
attending college. See SPERBER, supra note 52, at 168. 
56 See, e.g., id. at 169–70. 
57
 Id. at 171–73. Although the NCAA may have exhibited relatively “toothless” en-
forcement of its rules pertaining to recruitment and other matters, it encouraged, with 
some success, regulation of such matters at the conference level. By the 1940s, college 
football conferences, made up of athletically competitive schools independently orga-
nized by geographical region, functioned as relatively centralized entities with identifia-
ble leadership able to exert an influence over their members that the NCAA could not. 
See FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 44–47; SPERBER, supra note 52, at 173–74. 
58 See SPERBER, supra note 52, at 174. 
59 FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 47. 
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cruits be granted “on the basis of qualifications of which athletic ability is 
not one.”60 The general consensus was that college athletes ought not to 
receive in-kind payments to play sports.61 Two years later, those party to 
the Principles’ construction used them to form the backbone of the revolu-
tionary “Sanity Code” (the Code), an assemblage of rules on amateurism, 
eligibility, and financial aid, coupled with an unprecedented mechanism to 
enforce those rules,62 that NCAA membership voted into the NCAA con-
stitution in 1948.63 
Ultimately, the Sanity Code did not succeed in its mission to ensure 
nationwide compliance with NCAA rules.64 This was largely due to the 
Code’s extreme call for the expulsion of rules violators from the NCAA. 
When a substantial number of schools immediately refused to abide by the 
Code’s ban on athletic scholarships, the NCAA’s new enforcement arm 
proved simply unwilling to mete out such a drastic and heavy-handed 
punishment.65 
Despite the Sanity Code’s failure, however, it nevertheless set a 
precedent for cooperative action within the college football community to 
create a centralized, enforcement-oriented NCAA, a model inspired consi-
derably by the growing costs of fielding competitive college football 
teams.66 It was this precedent that transformed understandings of the 
NCAA’s potential, which thereby set the foundation for the full carteliza-
tion of the NCAA and a “new era of regulation” that would soon come to 
pass.67 
                                                 
60 SPERBER, supra note 52, at 173–74. 
61 Id. Fleisher describes the regulation, however, as one that simply “pushed all athlet-
ic scholarships through the regular financial aid routes,” thus eliminating athletic scholar-
ships in name only. FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 47. 
62 A Compliance Committee and a Fact-Finding Committee executed enforcement of 
the Sanity Code; the former serving to evaluate alleged Code violations and dispense 
punishment as necessary, and the latter functioning as the former’s investigative arm. 
FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 48. During the Sanity Code’s brief reign, most Code 
infractions involved violations of its prohibition of athletic-scholarships, a prohibition 
established in the name of amateurism. BYERS, supra note 22, at 67. 
63 FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 47. 
64
 Id. at 48. 
65 SPERBER, supra note 52, at 240–41. 
66 FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 65. 
67
 Id. at 51. 
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C. The Modern NCAA: Cartel Enforcement of Rules Supporting Economic 
Interests as Much as Amateurism 
On the heels of the Sanity Code’s failure, the NCAA entered its mod-
ern era by reshuffling its management hierarchy and reforming its ap-
proach to rules enforcement, two moves that solidified its managerial clout 
in the college sports landscape.68 Primarily, in 1953, NCAA members 
voted in their annual convention to grant the NCAA Council69 (the Coun-
cil) power to enforce NCAA-mandated rules other than the extreme meas-
ure of expulsion.70 Further, the Council received authority to impose pe-
nalties for rule violations without having to wait for the approval of its 
members.71 Now able to efficiently levy meaningful and realistic sanctions 
that could damage a school’s ability to compete athletically, the NCAA 
Council and its newly credible enforcement arm achieved a revolutionary 
change: through its ability to both effectively create and enforce rules, it 
was in a much improved position to regulate the behavior of its constituent 
members.72 
                                                 
68 Id. at 50–51, 65. In terms of management, the NCAA disbanded the Compliance 
and Fact-Finding Committees under the Sanity Code, essentially replacing them with a 
Membership Committee and a Subcommittee on Infractions, respectively. The Member-
ship Committee, charged with enforcing NCAA academic and amateur standards, would 
make rules enforcement recommendations to the Council of the NCAA that presided over 
the NCAA. Id. at 50. The NCAA Council would then subject the suggested penalties for 
an offending member to a vote of the entire convention. See, e.g., BYERS, supra note 22, 
at 59–61. 
69 FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 50. The NCAA Council functioned as an over-
sight committee for the association, similar to that of a corporation’s board of directors. 
See id. at 50, 70. Today, the NCAA Executive Committee performs this function for the 
entire NCAA, while the Division I Board of Directors and the Presidents’ Councils of 
Divisions II and III play this role at the individual division level. See NCAA, supra note 
4, at 29 fig.4-2. Members of the NCAA Executive Committee, taken from each of the 
NCAA’s three divisions, earn appointment to office from members of the aforementioned 
Board of Directors and Presidents’ Councils. See NCAA, supra note 4, art. 4.1.3, at 22. 
70 These powers included an ability to impose sanctions against offending schools 
such as: a ban from post-season play; limits on television appearances; scholarship re-
strictions; and even the “Death Penalty,” requiring a school to drop the offending sport 
for a determined number of seasons. RANDY R. GRANT ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF 
INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORTS 33 (2008). Today, rules enforcement occurs primarily at the 
division level, such that the NCAA Executive Committee, the contemporary equivalent 
of the old NCAA Council, is no longer so involved. See NCAA, supra note 4, at 28 
fig.4-1. 
71 GRANT, supra note 70, at 33. 
72 FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 50. 
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Motivating the move to establish this regulatory power, and influen-
cing member institutions’ willingness to accept it, was a television-fueled 
boom in the 1950s of the nationwide demand for college sports.73 With 
this boom finding the NCAA and its members as eager as ever74 to get a 
share of the “sports business pie,”75 commentators have asserted that the 
NCAA turned to cartelization76 as a means to maximize profits flowing 
from the considerable revenues that accompanied televised games.77 This 
was because cartel behavior, reflected in numerous rules agreements be-
tween NCAA members to restrict competition,78 would permit close regu-
lation of inputs and outputs in the college sports market, thereby allowing 
simultaneous minimization of costs and maximization of revenues.79 
For example, from 1953 to 1984, the NCAA was able to regulate both 
the number of televised football games a network could show and the 
number of television appearances a team could make during a given sea-
son.80 Until the Supreme Court banned that practice in 1984,81 it had not 
only made the “price [of televised football games] higher and [their] out-
put lower than they would otherwise be,”82 but it had also protected and 
maximized gate receipt revenues by limiting the supply of games that 
might otherwise be televised.83 In the eyes of more than a few informed 
observers, such efforts to restrict member competition in aid of profit 
                                                 
73 It was concomitant with this boom that “college sports began to tap the revenues 
from television exposure.” Id. at 51. 
74 Id. at 50. 
75 James V. Koch, A Troubled Cartel: The NCAA, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 
136 (1973) (quoting Marlow W. Cook, United States Senator from Kentucky). 
76 See, e.g., Depken & Wilson, supra note 27, at 226. That the NCAA functions, and 
has functioned for years, as a cartel is not necessarily a fact to which the NCAA would 
readily admit. See, e.g., Koch, supra note 75, at 136 (noting that the NCAA’s stated 
commitment to amateurism made no mention of its functioning as a “moderately success-
ful business cartel”). Fleisher notes, however, that “economists generally view the NCAA 
as a cartel ... because the NCAA has historically devised rules to restrict output ... and to 
restrict competition for inputs.” FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 5. 
77 BYERS, supra note 22, at 90 (noting the NCAA’s collection of impressive television 
revenues between the 1950s into the 1980s, reaped from football and men’s basketball 
contracts in particular); see also FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 54. 
78 See Koch, supra note 75, at 136–37. 
79 FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 51. Fleisher refers to the production of college 
sports as NCAA “output,” and to the students and coaches that produce this output as 
“inputs.” See, e.g., id. at 5, 51, 56. For the remainder of this Note, I will do the same. 
80 Id. at 52, 58–59. 
81 See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
82 Id. at 107. 
83 FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 56. 
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maximization and cost minimization demonstrated that the NCAA was 
becoming a certifiable business cartel.84 
Moreover, despite the Supreme Court’s call in the mid-1980s for the 
NCAA to cease regulation of television outputs, the NCAA has not backed 
away from its commercially-oriented cartel behavior in recent years.85 
Commentators identifying as much have pointed particularly to NCAA 
efforts at regulation of two primary inputs of the college sports market: 
student-athletes and coaches.86 As opposed to output restrictions, by which 
a cartel can increase product prices by limiting supply, input restrictions 
function to limit costs, thus permitting profit maximization by cutting 
expenses on the front end.87 The NCAA’s use of this practice has in-
creased steadily since its structural reform in 1953, intensified through 
early 1970s efforts to: (1) set the maximum price paid for intercollegiate 
athletes via scholarship compensation rules, (2) regulate the quantity of 
athletes “purchased” in a given year via limitations on scholarship num-
bers, and (3) regulate the duration and intensity of members’ usage of 
athletes with caps on eligibility and practice hours.88 One commentator 
noted in 1973 that such efforts were intended to at once suppress mem-
bers’ input costs and prevent certain members from gaining competitive 
advantages over others, the latter function boosting profits by maintaining 
consumer interest through the production of closely contested sporting 
events.89 Further, it is important to mention that the NCAA persists in 
these efforts today.90 
Since 1970, the NCAA’s institutionalization of such cost-cutting, in-
put-restriction efforts has been manifest in the physical expansion of the 
NCAA Manual.91 A publication of 161 pages in the 1970–1971 school 
year, it ballooned to a 1,268-page, three-volume edition by 1998–1999, 
much of which involved rules and restrictions regarding the recruitment 
and management of college athletes.92 Combining the effects of these rules 
with both the NCAA’s unabashed orientation as a revenue-seeking associ-
                                                 
84 See, e.g., Koch, supra note 75, at 136. 
85 See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 3, at 188–89. 
86 Id. 
87 See, e.g., FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 56, 58, 65. 
88 Koch, supra note 75, at 137. 
89 Id. at 137. 
90 See, e.g., NCAA, supra note 4, art. 15.02.2, 15.5.1, 17.01.1, at 194, 205, 237. 
91 See ZIMBALIST, supra note 32, at 239; see also FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 
94 (describing the NCAA manual as a reader’s guide to the cartel rules). 
92 See ZIMBALIST, supra note 32, at 239. The 2010–11 NCAA Manual weighs in at a 
voluminous 434 pages, approximately half of which concern rules pertaining to student-
athletes. See generally NCAA, supra note 4. 
218 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:203 
 
ation93 and the critical roles that college athletes play as revenue-
generating inputs,94 it becomes clear that today, at the very least, the 
NCAA is a cartel of members colluding to “reduce [input] costs and there-
by generate more ‘profit’ for their athletic programs.”95 
II. NCAA SCHOLARSHIP RULES: EVIDENCE OF ANTICOMPETITIVE 
BEHAVIOR 
The history of NCAA athletic scholarships, including the NCAA’s 
agreement to impose the one-year rule and per sport limitations, is illustra-
tive of the NCAA’s legacy of anticompetitive behavior,96 and was at the 
heart of Agnew’s complaint.97 This becomes particularly apparent upon 
examination of NCAA members’ traditional and strategic use of such 
scholarship rules to reduce their athletic departments’ costs. Ironically, 
however, the granting of athletic scholarships, or “grants-in-aid,” initially 
worked more to increase costs for individual schools than to limit them.98 
The grant-in-aid concept arose in the 1940s among schools lacking the 
facilities and prestige to compete for football recruits with college foot-
ball’s established powers in the Ivy League and the Big Ten Conference.99 
Specifically, if those lower profile, primarily southern,100 schools could 
not ride the growing wave of college football’s popularity101 by attracting 
athletes based on the schools’ existing merits, then they would do so by 
offering recruits a free education.102 By so doing, schools of lower athletic 
                                                 
93 See supra Part I; see also NCAA, REVENUES AND EXPENSES 2004–2009: NCAA 
DIVISION I INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS REPORT 17 tbl.2.1 (2010) [hereinaf-
ter “NCAA, REVENUES AND EXPENSES”]. 
94 See, e.g., FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 92–93 (offering estimates of boosts in 
revenue collection that star college athletes such as Patrick Ewing and Bo Jackson pro-
vided to their universities). 
95 BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 3, at 189. 
96 See, e.g., id.; SPERBER, supra note 30, at 210. 
97 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
98 See BYERS, supra note 22, at 68. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 See FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 42. 
102 See BYERS, supra note 22, at 68. Byers, a longtime NCAA executive director with 
deep Big Ten roots, notes with some apparent bitterness that, “[t]he South wanted to use 
the grant-in-aid to plunder the rich resources of white athletes in other parts of the coun-
try.” Id. Big Ten schools, meanwhile, though not formally offering grants-in-aid, began 
giving black athletes direct payments to play football in the aftermath of World War II. 
See SPERBER, supra note 52, at 169. This practice joined the already established “job 
plan” program in the Big Ten, by which schools paid athletes for “minimal work ... [and] 
phantom jobs.” Id. at 228. 
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repute were able to out-compete their better known rivals, thereby enhanc-
ing the status of their football programs, and, by consequence, the reputa-
tions of the schools themselves.103 Of course, giving out grants-in-aid 
meant a hike in input costs for those up-and-coming schools, which were 
not only financing athletes’ tuitions but also covering their lodging and 
incidental expenses.104 The schools deemed the expense a worthwhile one, 
however, as it offered the chance to expand their athletic programs and to 
thus acquire “a larger piece of ... [college football’s] economic pie.”105 
Despite the attempt of Big Ten schools to eliminate grants-in-aid from 
the NCAA through the inclusion of prohibitory terms in the 1948 Sanity 
Code,106 the access to big time football that scholarships offered drove 
many schools to maintain the practice and to ignore the new rules.107 
When the NCAA balked at expelling those scholarship-granting schools in 
response to their “revolt,”108 the Sanity Code, without a means of mea-
ningful enforcement, lost its relevance and was soon abandoned.109 By 
1952, with nearly every school in major college football, save the Ivy 
League, handing out grants-in-aid110 to remain competitive,111 the mem-
bers of the NCAA’s most ambitious football conferences,112 including 
those of the Big Ten, decided to institutionalize the practice.113 As a result, 
                                                 
103 Byers describes in particular the use of this tactic at Michigan State University, 
which used athletic scholarships to steer athletes away from the University of Michigan, 
and to pull both the football program and the school itself up by the “bootstraps.” See 
BYERS, supra note 22, at 41–43. 
104 See id. at 68. 
105 SPERBER, supra note 52, at 242. 
106 See id. at 233. 
107 See, e.g., SPERBER, supra note 52, (citing the University of Virginia as an exam-
ple). 
108 Id. at 241. 
109 See BYERS, supra note 22, at 68. 
110 See SPERBER, supra note 52, at 381. 
111 See BYERS, supra note 22, at 69. In addition to the competition motive, Byers 
attributes to scholarship proponents the additionally stated motive of reinforcing amateur-
ism in college sports through the elimination of direct cash payments from boosters to 
recruits. BYERS, supra note 22, at 72. Given, however, the NCAA’s 1953 invention of the 
term “student-athlete” to dissuade courts from characterizing athletes as workers in 
response to the recent proliferation of compensation via grants-in-aid, it seems unlikely 
that many in the NCAA viewed grants-in-aid as a boon to the NCAA’s stated amateur 
ideal. See BYERS, supra note 22, at 69. 
112 Despite their role as pioneers in the growth of college sports, members of the Ivy 
League rejected the notion of grants-in-aid and slowly began to deemphasize their athlet-
ic programs in the face of college sports’ increasing resemblance to professionalism. See 
SPERBER, supra note 9, at 271. 
113 See BYERS, supra note 22, at 72. 
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in 1956 the NCAA took charge of grants-in-aid, standardizing by general 
agreement both their substance and the guidelines for their distribution.114 
Of particular relevance to a bachelor’s degree-based complaint like 
Agnew’s was the NCAA’s adoption, or lack thereof, of “safety proscrip-
tions” regarding issues of scholarship duration and quantity that the 
NCAA addressed upon formally accepting grants-in-aid.115 Regarding the 
former was a provision for grants-in-aid to last a maximum of four 
years.116 In other words, granting institutions were generally at liberty to 
offer athletic scholarships from one to four years in duration,117 with a 
four-year “no-cut” scholarship as the most competitive package.118 Caps 
on total grants-in-aid, meanwhile, both per team and per year, rested with-
in the purview of member conferences, whose rules could be extremely 
liberal.119 
It did not take long, however, for NCAA members to determine that 
closer, more centralized regulation of athletic scholarships would work in 
their favor.120 These closer regulations began in earnest in 1973, when the 
NCAA eliminated four-year athletic scholarships, mandating that schools 
could thereafter only give grants on a one-year, renewable basis.121 The 
NCAA explained the move as a response to the actions of athletes who 
would accept athletic scholarships, but then refuse to compete.122 Member 
schools were uninterested in spending money on athletes in the form of 
multi-year scholarships, only to have those athletes quit their teams but 
keep the guaranteed education.123 Such reasoning, acknowledged by the 
NCAA no less, supports a description of the one-year rule as a collusively 
adopted cost-cutting measure intended to maximize degree prices for col-
lege athletes. 
                                                 
114 See id. at 72–73. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 72. 
117 Conferences tended to regulate this practice among their member schools, howev-
er, and some more tightly than others. For example, the Big Eight Conference might 
permit only one-year renewable grants, while the Southwestern Conference would permit 
four-year grants. See id. at 76. 
118 See id. at 75. 
119 The Southeastern Conference, for example, permitted its members forty new foot-
ball grants each year with an overall total of one hundred twenty-five permissible per 
year. See BYERS, supra note 22, at 220. 
120 See, e.g., Koch & Leonard, supra note 27, at 235; BYERS, supra note 22, at 226–
27. 
121 SPERBER, supra note 30, at 207. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
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Further supporting a bachelor’s degree-based antitrust argument was 
the NCAA’s decision to place an enforced cap on total scholarship num-
bers in 1976.124 Imposition of this rule meant that by the mid-1970s, a 
football team of over one hundred players could carry a maximum of only 
ninety-five scholarship athletes, and could dole out only twenty-five new 
scholarships to incoming players each year.125 This decision, a response to 
financial difficulties faced by NCAA members with swollen athletic de-
partment budgets,126 was one of 225 amendments proposed at the 1976 
NCAA convention, the “great majority” of which “dealt with cost reduc-
tion.”127 In light of this reality, the description of scholarship caps as cost-
reducing, anticompetitive measures to maximize the cost of bachelor’s 
degrees gains strength. Moreover, it is of note that although the primary 
utility of the grant-in-aid cap was its role in reducing scholarship costs for 
NCAA schools, one observer noted soon after the rule’s passage that 
schools additionally appreciated its effect of “giv[ing] them the legal and 
moral sanction of the NCAA” to make way for new athletes by canceling 
the scholarships of those who did not become stars.128 With the over-
whelming resemblance of this practice to Agnew’s situation,129 and given 
the practice’s origins in NCAA measures to reduce input costs, a claim of 
victimization at the hands of collusive NCAA agreements to cut costs 
takes on still greater credibility. 
III. THE SHERMAN ACT, SECTION I: ANTITRUST OVERVIEW AND THE 
ACT’S HISTORY WITH THE NCAA 
In order to obtain relief from the courts, however, Agnew’s claim of 
NCAA price fixing and anticompetitive collusion must survive less an 
                                                 
124 See Koch & Leonard, supra note 27, at 235. 
125 BYERS, supra note 22, at 226. 
126 See Koch & Leonard, supra note 27, at 235; BYERS, supra note 22, at 219–21. 
Byers notes, for example, that despite considerable increases in college football atten-
dance and television revenues during the 1960s, this new money “was chasing the 174% 
increase in football costs.” Id. at 220. 
127 Koch & Leonard, supra note 27, at 235. 
128 Id. at 236. 
129 When Agnew’s coach left Rice for the University of Tulsa, “the new Rice coach 
switched Agnew’s scholarship to a recruit of his own.” See Branch, supra note 10. This 
practice, by which coaches refuse to renew an athlete’s scholarship in order to replace 
him with another, is known as “running off.” The practice continues to occur with some 
regularity, yet the NCAA has done little to prevent it. See, e.g., Seth Davis, New Coaches 
Thomas, Calipari Hurting Players in Scholarship Game, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 24, 
2009, available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/writers/seth_davis/06/24/hoop 
.thoughts/index.html. 
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application of logical and historical analysis, and more the standards of 
antitrust jurisprudence, which have seen courts treat the NCAA somewhat 
differently than other would-be Sherman Act violators.130 An overview of 
Section I of the Sherman Act (the Act), a synopsis of the Act’s interpreta-
tion by federal courts, and an examination of federal courts’ treatment of 
the NCAA in the face of previous Section I challenges is therefore neces-
sary. 
A. The Sherman Act, Section I: Overview 
1. Foundations and Purpose 
Although commentators disagree as to Congress’s precise motivation 
for the development and passage of the Sherman Act in 1890,131 there 
appears to be less dispute that this “legislative watershed[]” was revolutio-
nary in its enabling of government agencies and private parties to enforce 
prohibitions against trade restraints and monopolization.132 Functioning to 
improve upon the “hazy” dimensions of common law,133 under which 
harmful trade restraints and monopolistic acts were unlikely to be chal-
lenged as unenforceable, the Act threatened considerable legal conse-
quences for anticompetitive economic behavior,134 and granted courts a 
more concrete reference point by which to identify those harmful acts.135 
Finally, though the Act’s rather broad language136 initially imposed an 
“interpretive challenge” upon courts to determine those “specific forms of 
collective and unilateral conduct that pose unacceptable competitive dan-
                                                 
130 See, e.g., Nagy, supra note 26, at 332–33. 
131 Theories as to Congress’s goals include: (1) a desire to promote consumer welfare; 
(2) an intent to allow small firms, farmers, and other individuals to compete with large 
manufacturers; (3) an attempt to prevent unfair redistributions of wealth from consumers 
to producers; and (4) an effort to sustain the vitality of democratic institutions. See 
GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 33, at 21–22. 
132 Id. at 20, 24. 
133 Id. at 21. 
134 See id. at 24. Specifically, the Sherman Act grants aggrieved claimants the hefty 
award of treble damages and attorneys’ fees. Id. The act provides for criminal punish-
ment of the prohibited activities as well, threatening fines of up to $100 million for cor-
porations and $1 million for individuals, or imprisonment for up to ten years. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1 (2006). 
135 GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 33, at 24. 
136 The prohibitory language of the Sherman Act, Section I (the section with which 
Agnew’s complaint is concerned) reads: “Every contract, combination in the form of trust 
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, 
or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
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gers,”137 courts have met the challenge by establishing practical tests to 
identify and punish such activities as cooperative price fixing, boycotts, 
and output restrictions.138 
In accusing the NCAA and its members of unlawfully agreeing to arti-
ficially inflate the price of a bachelor’s degree for scholarship athletes, 
Agnew’s complaint implicates Section I of the Sherman Act by describing 
this alleged restraint of trade as an exercise in horizontal price fixing.139 
Such an action, in which separate, competing entities of a particular mar-
ket conspire jointly140 to inhibit inter-firm competition by fixing prices,141 
involves a collective effort to carry out the improperly restrictive agree-
ments prohibited by Section I.142 This activity is distinct from the unilater-
al conduct of a single firm or person to establish monopoly power over a 
market through wrongful exclusionary means, as prohibited by Section II 
of the Sherman Act.143 
2. Section I Jurisprudence and the Rule of Reason 
In terms of Section I analysis, though, it is important to note that 
courts will not deem all restraints of trade illegal.144 This has followed 
from the Supreme Court’s 1910 reasoning in Standard Oil Co. v. United 
States,145 in which the Court recognized that any contract, “by obligating 
one party to another,” must restrain trade to some extent.146 In so deciding, 
the Court characterized as unacceptable only those restraints of trade that 
are “unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions,”147 a statement 
affirming for posterity the importance of understanding a trade restraint’s 
effects before drawing any legal conclusions.148 As a result, for a plaintiff 
                                                 
137 GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 33, at 23. 
138 See infra Part III.A.2. 
139 Complaint at para. 1, Agnew v. NCAA (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 10-4804). 
140 See GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 33, at 224. 
141 See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 106–07 (1984). 
142 GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 33, at 23. 
143 Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). Commentator Christopher Norris points out that 
the NCAA cannot be found guilty of a Section II violation, as it is by definition “not a 
monopolist, but the result of a group of competitors who have combined to place some 
restraints on the [college sports] market.” Christopher B. Norris, Trick Play: Are the 
NCAA’s New Division I-A Requirements an Illegal Boycott?, 56 SMU L. REV. 2355, 
2364 (2003). 
144 See GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 33, at 26. 
145 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58–62 (1910). 
146 See Norris, supra note 143, at 2364. 
147 Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 58. 
148 See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 1998). 
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to prevail in most claims under Section I of the Sherman Act today, he or 
she must prove at the outset that the accused: “(1) participated in an 
agreement that (2) unreasonably restrained trade in the relevant mar-
ket.”149 
Building on Standard Oil was the Supreme Court’s articulation in 
1918 of a “rule of reason” in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States.150 
In this case, the Court discarded the notion that a certain activity, here a 
price fixing effort by parties with power in the relevant market, should be 
considered automatically unreasonable and thus “per se” illegal;151 in-
stead, the Court insisted on a more deliberate approach. A “true test of 
legality,” it stated, must ask whether the restraint imposed uses regulation 
to promote competition, or instead only suppresses and destroys it.152 
Upon establishing the rule of reason as a legitimate means for analysis 
of restraint of trade issues, the aftermath of Chicago Board of Trade saw 
courts left with two relatively workable Section I tests: a “per se rule and 
the rule of reason.”153 Today the per se rule applies to those “naked re-
straint[s] of trade” that courts have deemed unacceptable under any cir-
cumstances, on account of their recognized tendency to “always or almost 
always ... restrict competition.”154 The rule of reason, on the other hand, 
applies to all restraints of trade not considered illegal per se, and requires a 
showing that the challenged action has or can have an adverse effect on 
competition that is both unjustifiable and substantial.155 
                                                 
149 Id. 
150 See Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see also 
GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 33, at 174–79. 
151 GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 33, at 177. 
152 See Chi. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238. The Court went on to note that the test’s 
application should involve consideration of the following factors: “facts peculiar to the 
business” in question, the condition of the business before and after the restraint’s impo-
sition, and the probable or actual nature of the restraint’s effect. Id. Although this land-
mark decision provided a foundation for future analysis of restraint of trade claims, it left 
in its wake some perplexing questions, such as how to rank the stated factors and on 
which party the burden would rest to provide proof regarding those factors. See 
GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 33, at 176–77. 
153 See Law, 134 F.3d at 1016. 
154 Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979). Interestingly, courts will 
generally declare horizontal price-fixing schemes, such as that in which Agnew has 
alleged the NCAA to have engaged, as illegal per se. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of 
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984). Courts have, however, permitted the NCAA to 
engage in a wide range of horizontal agreements, largely in the name of the NCAA’s 
stated commitment to amateurism. See Nagy, supra note 26, at 332–33. 
155 See Law, 134 F.3d at 1017. 
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As suggested by Chicago Board of Trade, however, the rule of reason 
analysis becomes complex due to its demand for the consideration of nu-
merous factors.156 Although courts today rely on a fairly standardized, 
multi-step test in analyzing restraints of trade under this rule, the process 
can become a protracted one.157 
Described as a structure cast “in terms of shifting burdens of proof,”158 
the test places an initial burden on a plaintiff to show that there has been 
an agreement to restrain interstate trade in order to produce significant 
anticompetitive effects within a relevant market.159 In response to this 
burden, a plaintiff must first offer contextual information to help the court 
better understand the challenged practice’s negative effect on competi-
tion.160 These initial hurdles generally include: (1) a demonstration that the 
challenged act was an agreement implicating trade or commerce,161 (2) 
identification of the relevant market in which the challenged restraint will 
be felt, and (3) the provision of evidence establishing the defendant’s 
power over that market.162 Further, whereas the definition of “commer-
cial” in this context is unclear, thus impelling courts to examine the nature 
of a challenged act “in light of the totality of the surrounding circums-
tances,”163 more concrete definitions for “relevant market” and “market 
power” do exist. Specifically, a relevant market is one comprising of 
products “reasonably interchangeable” with those that a defendant sells164 
or buys,165 and which extends over a defined geographic area.166 Market 
power, meanwhile, exists with a party’s ability “to alter the interaction of 
supply and demand in the market,”167 thus permitting that party “to raise 
                                                 
156 See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
157 See, e.g., Law, 134 F.3d at 1019–20. 
158 Id. at 1019. 
159 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2010 WL 445190, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) (quoting 
Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
160 See Law, 134 F.3d at 1019. 
161 See, e.g., In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 
1149 (W.D. Wash. 2005). 
162 Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v. NCAA, 339 F. Supp. 2d 545, 549–50 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
163 United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 666 (3d Cir. 1993). 
164 Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 549. 
165 Recall that an agreement to restrain trade can exist among cartel members control-
ling either an output market as sellers or an input market as buyers. See In re NCAA I-A 
Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1151–52. 
166 That is, a plaintiff must define the geographic region across which the relevant 
market stretches. See WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 3:4 (2009). 
167 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984). 
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prices above those that would be charged in a competitive market.”168 It is 
of note, however, that where proof of a blatant or “naked” trade restraint 
demonstrating clear anticompetitive effects exists, some courts have 
shown a willingness to bypass the context-building function of market 
analysis altogether.169 Application of this practice, known as a “quick 
look” rule of reason analysis, is often appropriate in horizontal price fixing 
cases, the understood purpose of which is often to make prices “unrespon-
sive to a competitive marketplace.”170 
Regardless of whether a court utilizes a traditional or quick look rule 
of reason, a plaintiff must at some point meet his or her burden of showing 
the anticompetitive nature of the defendant’s activity.171 When a restraint 
of trade is alleged to exist, indicators of anticompetitive elements typically 
include prices and outputs unresponsive to consumer preference, thus 
leaving prices higher and outputs lower than they would otherwise be.172 
A plaintiff may, alternatively, indirectly show the existence of anticompe-
titive effects by demonstrating the defendant’s overwhelming market 
power.173 
Provided that the plaintiff survives this first step, the burden then shifts 
to the defendant to show the merits of his or her activity by pointing out its 
procompetitive elements.174 In other words, the defendant must show that, 
on balance, the restraint in question functions to enhance competition.175 
Should a court determine the targeted practice’s anticompetitive effects 
outweigh its procompetitive virtues, then a finding of an antitrust violation 
will result.176 
                                                 
168 Id. at 109 n.38. 
169 See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998). 
170 Id. at 1019–20. 
171 See HOLMES, supra note 166, § 3:4. 
172 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 106–07. 
173 Law, 134 F.3d at 1010, 1019. 
174 Id. at 1017. 
175 Id. at 1021. 
176 See, e.g., Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 119–20; Law, 134 F.3d at 1024. It is of note 
that should a court find the procompetitive qualities of a horizontal agreement to over-
whelm its anticompetitive effects, all is not lost for the plaintiff. Rather, a court at this 
point will apply the final step of a rule of reason analysis by deciding whether a “less 
restrictive alternative” to the complained of practice exists. See Thomas A. Baker III et 
al., White v. NCAA: A Chink in the Antitrust Armor, 21 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 75, 93 
(2011) (citing Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1997)). If a 
plaintiff can convince a court of such an alternative, the court will in turn find an antitrust 
violation. See id. 
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B. The Sherman Act and the NCAA: A Two-Sided Relationship 
If, as asserted in Part I supra, the NCAA is a cartel seeking to minim-
ize costs and maximize profits by limiting inter-member competition for 
inputs,177 then it would seem perfectly reasonable to expect courts’ hostile 
treatment of such an apparent antitrust violation.178 Thus, it has been to the 
consternation of many commentators179 that federal courts have often 
taken the opposite approach, frequently determining that restrictive NCAA 
rules regarding its inputs are, in fact, legally acceptable.180 Informing this 
seemingly counterintuitive reasoning has been courts’ recognition of the 
NCAA’s stated commitment to the preservation of amateurism in college 
sports.181 Application of this reasoning has arisen most often in courts’ 
responses to college athletes’ antitrust attacks on the NCAA’s eligibility 
rules, which courts have consistently recognized as procompetitive efforts 
to boost the popularity of college sports by preserving its unique amateur 
character.182 
That said, federal courts have insisted even in rulings favorable to the 
NCAA that it is not exempt from antitrust scrutiny,183 and in two cases, 
NCAA v. Board of Regents and Law v. NCAA, have found the NCAA in 
violation of Section I of the Sherman Act.184 With these cases breaking 
                                                 
177 See, e.g., BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 3, at 189. 
178 Gellhorn notes that informing the policy behind Section I is an assumption that 
“society may lose the benefits from competition if rivals are permitted to join together 
and to consolidate their market power.” GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 33, at 156. 
179 See generally, e.g., Mitten, supra note 24; Mitten, supra note 28, at 62–63; Nagy, 
supra note 26, at 331–35; Chad W. Pekron, The Professional Student-Athlete: Undermin-
ing Amateurism as an Antitrust Defense in NCAA Compensation Challenges, 24 
HAMLINE L. REV. 24, 28–29 (2000). 
180 See, e.g., Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998); Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 
1081 (7th Cir. 1992); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); Hennessey 
v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1990); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975). 
181 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
182 See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984) 
(noting that the amateur character of college football “makes it more popular than profes-
sional sports to which it might otherwise be comparable, such as ... minor league base-
ball”); Banks, 977 F.2d at 1089 (asserting the NCAA’s “vital role” in preserving college 
football’s amateur character, thereby “enabl[ing] a product to be marketed which might 
otherwise be unavailable”). 
183 See, e.g., Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 744 (noting that the NCAA, “with its multimil-
lion dollar annual budget, is engaged in a business venture and is not entitled to a total 
exemption from antitrust regulation”). 
184 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120; Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1024 (10th 
Cir. 1998). 
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from the seeming jurisprudential norm of NCAA antitrust analysis, it is of 
interest that both involved not eligibility rules, but rather NCAA-imposed 
restrictions on outputs and input costs, respectively.185 
In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court applied the quick look rule of 
reason186 to find an antitrust violation in the NCAA’s practice of restrict-
ing both the quantity of college football games televised and the number 
of televised games allowed to a given team in a single season.187 In using 
the quick look approach, the Court explained that though the NCAA’s 
television plan involved horizontal price fixing, which is ordinarily “illeg-
al per se,”188 some rule of reason application was appropriate for an indus-
try like college sports, “in which horizontal restraints on competition are 
essential if the product is to be available at all.”189 A full blown rule of 
reason analysis, meanwhile, including both the precise identification of a 
relevant market and an evaluation of market power, was not necessary 
because the NCAA’s television plan involved an “agreement not to com-
pete in terms of price or output” that required no industry analysis to dem-
onstrate its anticompetitive character.190 Ultimately, the Court decided that 
the NCAA’s procompetitive justifications for the plan did not outweigh its 
anticompetitive effects.191 Specifically, the plan both decreased the output 
of games to viewers and increased their price for television networks.192 
This effect, noted the Court, was in opposition to factual findings regard-
ing demands of the market, and therefore directly violated the Sherman 
Act’s procompetitive, consumer-oriented policy.193 
Law v. NCAA, decided fourteen years later, relied greatly on the rea-
soning of Board of Regents in reaching a similar conclusion.194 In particu-
lar, upon confronting a Section I complaint regarding the NCAA’s imposi-
tion of maximum salary limits on entry-level assistant coaches at Division 
I schools, the Tenth Circuit applied the quick look rule of reason to deem 
                                                 
185 See Mitten, supra note 24, at 3. 
186 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 109–10. 
187 Id. at 118–20. 
188 Law, 134 F.3d at 1010, 1017. 
189 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101. 
190 Id. at 109. “The [NCAA’s] plan,” wrote the Court, “is inconsistent with the Sher-
man Act’s command that price and supply be responsive to consumer preference.... This 
naked restraint on price and output requires some competitive justification even in the 
absence of a detailed market analysis.” Id. at 110. 
191 Id. at 114. 
192 Id. at 107. 
193 Id. at 119–20. 
194 See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1024 (10th Cir. 1998). 
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the “restricted-earnings coaches” (REC) Rule195 an anticompetitive, cost-
cutting measure.196 This approach followed from the court’s recognition of 
the REC Rule as an effective horizontal price-fixing agreement, as it noted 
that “[n]o ‘proof of market power’ is required where the very purpose ... is 
to fix prices so as to make them unresponsive to a competitive market-
place.”197 The court then deemed the NCAA’s procompetitive rationales 
insufficient to overcome the REC Rule’s anticompetitive nature, pointing 
out especially that a horizontal agreement is acceptable only when enhanc-
ing competition, rather than merely maintaining the status quo.198 The 
court further noted that the motivation of cost savings, apparent here in the 
effort to minimize input costs by capping certain coaches’ salaries, could 
not qualify under antitrust laws as a defense to anticompetitive effects.199 
Though there has been no successful antitrust claim against the NCAA 
since Law, the 2008 settlement of White v. NCAA200 suggests additional 
support for the notion that courts will not uphold NCAA rules placing 
limits on input costs.201 The claim in White, a response to NCAA rules 
limiting grant-in-aid compensation to tuition, books, and room and 
board,202 described those rules as the product of NCAA collusion to keep 
maximum athletic scholarship payments below the actual cost of attending 
college.203 Although the NCAA denied any wrongdoing, it nonetheless 
agreed to terms of settlement, establishing, among other payments, a $218 
million fund to cover the expenses of athletes in need over a period of six 
years.204 That the NCAA settled the case is not determinative of how a 
federal court would have decided it. At the very least, however, the 
NCAA’s decision did seem to be an acknowledgment of a potential find-
ing of antitrust liability. 
                                                 
195 Id. at 1014. 
196 Id. at 1024. 
197 Id. at 1020. 
198 Id. at 1024. 
199 Id. at 1020. 
200 See White v. NCAA, Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, No. CV-06-0999 
RGK (C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 28, 2008); see also Jack Carey & Andy Gardiner, NCAA 
Agrees to $10M Settlement in Antitrust Lawsuit, USA TODAY, Jan. 30, 2008, http://www 
.usatoday.com/sports/college/2008-01-29-ncaasettlement_N.htm. For an in-depth look at 
the plaintiffs’ claim in White and a step-by-step review of the full blown rule of reason 
analysis a court would apply to most student-athlete antitrust claims brought against the 
NCAA, see Baker III et al., supra note 176. 
201 See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 3, at 10–11 & nn.37–38, 198; see also Carey 
& Gardiner, supra note 200. 
202 See Baker III et al., supra note 176, at 76; Carey & Gardiner, supra note 200. 
203 BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 3, at 198. 
204 Id.; Carey & Gardiner, supra note 200. 
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Given the outcomes of Board of Regents, Law, and White over the 
twenty-year span during which they occurred, somewhat of a pattern ap-
peared to have arisen regarding federal courts’ treatment of antitrust accu-
sations against the NCAA. In terms of NCAA rules addressing athlete 
eligibility requirements and other amateurism-centric provisions, these 
seemed “to be virtually per se legal under the antitrust laws.”205 On the 
other hand, where evidence existed of effective agreements among NCAA 
members to directly fix prices in college sports’ input or output markets, 
the possibility had arisen that courts would find antitrust violations via 
application of the quick look rule of reason.206 
The ruling in Agnew v. NCAA, however, upon firmly rejecting the 
plaintiffs’ claim that NCAA enforcement of the one-year scholarship rule 
and per sport scholarship caps constituted an illegal attempt to fix the 
prices of bachelor’s degrees, resisted any momentum that Board of Re-
gents, Law, and White might have built in favor of a price fixing claim 
against the NCAA.207 That said, in dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint on 
the pleadings, the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Indiana did not cite concerns for amateurism to explain its ruling.208 The 
court instead applied a full blown rule of reason analysis, and determined 
in its attendant market analysis that a market for the sale of bachelor’s 
degrees could not exist, reasoning that bachelor’s degrees are not bought 
and sold, but rather must be earned.209 
                                                 
205 See Mitten, supra note 24, at 5. 
206 Id. at 4; see also In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 
2d 1144 (W.D. Wash. 2005). In the case of White, the parties settled the matter before the 
court could issue a final ruling. See Baker III et al., supra note 176, at 77. 
207 See Agnew v. NCAA, No. 1:11-cv-0293-JMS-MJD, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98744 
(S.D. Ind. Sept. 1, 2011). 
208 Id. 
209 See id. at *27–30. In finding a market for bachelor’s degrees “implausible,” the 
court pointed out that “earning a bachelor’s degree requires the student to attend class, 
take required courses, and maintain certain grades, among many other things.” Id. at *28. 
For the court, however, to suggest that all top tier college athletes “earn” bachelor’s 
degrees in the same way that non-athletes do is misleading. The court did not mention, 
for example, that athletic departments at Division I universities have made liberal use of 
academic fraud—often by finding tutors to complete athletes’ schoolwork for them—to 
keep these athletes academically eligible so they can continue to compete. See, e.g., 
Jonathan Jones, UNC NCAA Football Academic Fraud Case Details Released, THE 
DAILY TAR HEEL, Sept. 22, 2011, available at http://www.dailytarheel.com/index.php 
/article/2011/09/unc_ncaa_football_academic_fraud_case_details_released; Tom Farrey, 
Seminoles Helped by “LD” Diagnoses, ESPN.COM (Dec. 18, 2009), http://sports.espn 
.go.com/espn/otl/news/story?id=4737281; Doug Lederman, Another Case of Academic 
Fraud, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 21, 2010, 3:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com 
/news/2010/01/21/gasouthern. Moreover, even where such fraud does not occur, universi-
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In electing to use a full blown rule of reason analysis, the Agnew court 
departed from the quick look analyses applied by the Supreme Court and 
the Tenth Circuit in Board of Regents and Law respectively.210 Whereas a 
quick look would not have demanded definition of a relevant market,211 
the court elected instead to follow Seventh Circuit precedent, determining 
therefore that an antitrust claim against the NCAA “must allege anticom-
petitive effects on a discernible market.”212 By not proclaiming amateur-
ism as a bar to a bachelor’s degree-based price fixing claim against the 
NCAA, and by instead using the market definition requirement of the full 
blown rule of reason analysis to dismiss such a claim, the court in Agnew 
set aside the NCAA’s traditional amateurism shield, and thus left open the 
possibility of a plaintiff’s victory in a court more amenable to the quick 
look approach. 
IV. APPLYING SECTION I ANTITRUST ANALYSIS TO A BACHELOR’S 
DEGREE-BASED COMPLAINT 
In asserting the unlawfulness of NCAA members’ ongoing agreement 
to place limitations on athletic scholarships, thereby restricting competi-
tion in the pricing and availability of bachelor’s degrees for student-
athletes, a bachelor’s degree-based complaint places the challenged scho-
larship rules within the category of output market restrictions upon which 
federal courts have looked unfavorably, and could thus induce a court to 
find an antitrust violation. Specifically, before a court feeling less bound 
by precedent to apply the demanded market analysis of the full blown rule 
                                                                                                                         
ties routinely hire tutors to help student-athletes fulfill their academic obligations. See, 
e.g., Erin Hartness, UNC to Phase out Undergrads as Tutors for Athletes, WRAL 
SPORTSFAN.COM (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.wralsportsfan.com/unc/story/10165186/. 
With Division I universities expending so many resources, and in some cases violating 
NCAA rules, to ensure their scholarship athletes remain academically eligible for the 
duration of their college careers, it seems that in many cases a student athlete’s path to a 
bachelor’s degree is less challenging than that of a non-athlete. When scholarship athletes 
enter college as illiterate freshmen and graduate several years later, the concept of a 
market for bachelor’s degrees begins to seem less implausible. See Farrey, supra. 
210 See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109–10 (1984); Law 
v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1014 (10th Cir. 1998). 
211 See, e.g., Law, 134 F.3d at 1020 (noting that anticompetitive effect can be estab-
lished without determination of a relevant market); Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. 
NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 674 (citing with approval use of a quick look rule of reason that 
eschews defining a market). 
212 Agnew v. NCAA, No. 1:11-cv-0293-JMS-MJD, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98744, at 
*13 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 1, 2011) (quoting Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 
1992)). 
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of reason, the commercially motivated horizontal agreement behind the 
challenged rules would allow a court to not only ignore issues of amateur-
ism but also make use of quick look analysis. Upon such an approach, the 
challenged rules could well not survive. 
A. The Questioned Scholarship Rules Implicate Commercial Interests, Not 
Concerns for Amateurism 
Recognizing the distinction federal courts have drawn between the 
NCAA’s horizontal agreements to promote amateurism and those that 
unlawfully fix prices,213 study of the origins of the challenged scholarship 
rules shows the agreements creating them to fall squarely in the latter 
category. Suggesting as much are both the motives that informed those 
rules and the willingness of federal courts to associate financial aid for 
college students with “trade or commerce.”214 
Whereas the majority of federal courts have described most NCAA 
rules as protective of amateurism and thus safe from the commercially 
oriented agreements with which the Sherman Act is concerned,215 several 
have also accepted the notion that financial assistance to students is a 
commercial transaction.216 The court in In re I-A Walk-On Football Play-
ers Litigation advanced this view, drawing a distinction between NCAA 
rules addressing student-athlete eligibility and the rule implementing per 
sport scholarship limitations that a bachelor’s degree-based claim could 
cite.217 In particular, upon responding to an NCAA motion for judgment 
on the pleadings, that court noted the possibility that NCAA rules impos-
ing scholarship restrictions, while certainly not advancing amateurism, 
might instead function to unlawfully contain costs, and could thereby 
become vulnerable to Sherman Act scrutiny.218 With federal court 
precedent thus seemingly in favor of viewing NCAA scholarship restric-
tions as commercially oriented,219 examination of the historical motives 
for those restrictions provides further support for their commercial nature. 
                                                 
213 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
214 In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1149 
(W.D. Wash. 2005). 
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219 It is of note that in dismissing Agnew’s bachelor’s degree-based claim, the district 
court in Agnew v. NCAA made reference to the shield of amateurism that has often pro-
tected the NCAA from antitrust challenges, but at no point stated that this shield would 
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With respect to the one-year rule, persuasive evidence for the primacy 
of financial motives informing scholarship restrictions follows from the 
difficult circumstances that arose after the NCAA’s 1956 institutionaliza-
tion of athletic scholarships.220 Although the NCAA at that time permitted 
schools to grant their athletes four-year scholarships, certain athletic con-
ferences only permitted affiliated members to offer one-year renewable 
scholarships.221 This disparity threatened a “talent drain” of the most ca-
pable athletes from one-year scholarship schools.222 The result was con-
cern among several big-time football programs during the 1960s and 
1970s that a loss in talent would mean a decrease in their “escalating re-
wards” for winning provided by an “ever-rising flood of television mon-
ey.”223 The NCAA’s response was permissive legislation intended to as-
suage those influential schools’ commercially-inspired concerns.224 Of 
particular relevance, as discussed in Part II supra, was the agreement of 
NCAA members to permit the granting of all athletic scholarships on only 
a one-year renewable basis.225 Whether the motive for this rule was, as 
evidence suggests, to protect the NCAA’s valuable college football prod-
uct by placing its powerhouses on a more equal footing, or, by the 
NCAA’s account, to prevent athletes from accepting four-year grants only 
to quit their sport at the school’s expense,226 there appears little doubt that 
the one-year rule was a commercially informed measure, not one intended 
to safeguard amateurism and serve the interests of student-athletes. 
Recalling the origins of per sport scholarship caps demonstrates simi-
larly commercial motivations.227 The idea originated during the 1975 
“Economy Convention,”228 the purpose of which was to address the in-
creasingly unmanageable athletics budgets of the NCAA’s most athletical-
ly competitive schools. With a need to cut costs in order to “save money 
for the colleges,” and in an effort to “spread player talent” among Division 
I football programs,229 the NCAA sought again to limit input spending by 
dictating a hard cap of scholarship players that a given team could carry in 
                                                                                                                         
apply to the contested scholarship rules. See Agnew v. NCAA, No. 1:11-cv-0293-JMS-
MJD, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98744, at *12, *24–30 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 1, 2011). 
220 See BYERS, supra note 22, at 72–73. 
221 See id. at 75–76. 
222 Id. at 75. 
223 Id. at 76. 
224 Id. 
225 See SPERBER, supra note 30, at 207. 
226 Id. at 207. 
227 See discussion supra Part II. 
228 BYERS, supra note 22, at 225. 
229 Id. at 228. 
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a given sport.230 In this way, the per sport scholarship caps join the one-
year rule as NCAA regulations instituted for the purpose of reducing 
members’ costs in producing college sports. Because these rules have thus 
functioned as a means to fix production costs rather than to preserve ama-
teurism,231 a plaintiff characterizing those rules as commercially inspired 
products of an illegal horizontal agreement would likely be able to avoid 
the shield of amateurism that has deflected so many prior antitrust chal-
lenges of NCAA behavior. 
B.  Passing the Rule of Reason Test 
As discussed in Part III.B supra, however, mere evidence of NCAA 
price-fixing activity in the output market of bachelor’s degrees for college 
athletes is not sufficient to demonstrate an antitrust violation. The Su-
preme Court asserted in Board of Regents that where an industry requires 
at least some horizontal restraints on competition to make its product 
available at all, it would be unreasonable to deem an NCAA price-fixing 
agreement illegal per se.232 In response to complaints regarding NCAA 
horizontal price-fixing efforts, courts have instead used the rule of reason 
to decide upon allegations of Sherman Act violations.233 
1. Appropriateness of Quick Look versus Full Blown Analysis 
Assuming a court’s use of the rule of reason to evaluate a bachelor’s 
degree-based claim, it would need to decide whether to apply a quick look 
or a full-blown analysis.234 As seen in Agnew,235 the latter would force a 
plaintiff to demonstrate both a relevant market and the NCAA’s market 
power regarding production of athletic scholarships.236 The former would 
allow him to instead rely only on a demonstrably effective effort by the 
NCAA to so nakedly fix the prices of bachelor’s degrees for student-
athletes as to make them unresponsive to a competitive marketplace.237 
                                                 
230 See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text. 
231 See, e.g., BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 3, at 188–89. 
232 See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text. 
233 See supra notes 186–89, 195 and accompanying text. 
234 See supra notes 189–90 and accompanying text. 
235 See Agnew v. NCAA, No. 1:11-cv-0293-JMS-MJD, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
98744, at *24–30 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 1, 2011). 
236 See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
237 See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998). The court in Law wrote 
specifically that: 
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In Agnew, the court cited the importance of adherence to Seventh Cir-
cuit precedent in deciding to apply a full blown rule of reason analysis.238 
It is certainly conceivable, however, that a court beyond the constraints of 
Seventh Circuit precedent would apply the quick look analysis to a claim 
similar to that of Agnew’s: that is, by its promulgation of the one-year rule 
and per sport scholarship caps via horizontal agreement, the NCAA and its 
members have fixed the price of bachelor’s degrees for student athletes at 
artificially high levels.239 Supporting the quick look approach on one hand 
would be its use in a case like Law, in which the Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit found the “obvious anticompetitive effects” of an alleged 
NCAA price fixing scheme to warrant quick look analysis.240 Further 
supporting the quick look tack are the anticompetitive origins of the one-
year rule and per sport scholarship caps, measures intended to restrain 
NCAA members’ competition for student-athletes by limiting both the 
quantity and duration of athletic scholarships.241 
2. Anticompetitive Effects 
Upon review of student-athletes’ access to bachelor’s degrees via 
scholarship before the imposition of the one-year and per sport rules, the 
“obvious anticompetitive effects”242 following enforcement of those rules 
become more apparent.243 The discussions in Parts II and IV.A, supra, 
explain that before institution of the scholarship restrictions, schools had 
significant latitude in terms of the duration and quantity of the scholar-
ships they offered.244 This meant that the price and supply of bachelor’s 
                                                                                                                         
Under a quick look rule of reason analysis, anticompetitive effect is es-
tablished, even without a determination of the relevant market, where 
the plaintiff shows that a horizontal agreement to fix prices exists, that 
the agreement is effective, and that the price set by such an agreement 
is more favorable to the defendant than would have resulted from the 
operation of market forces. 
Id. 
238 See Agnew, 2011 U.S. Dist. at *12–13. 
239 See Complaint at para. 1, Agnew v. NCAA (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 10-4804). 
240 Law, 134 F.3d at 1020. 
241 See discussion infra Part VI.B.2–3. 
242 Law, 134 F.3d at 1020. 
243 Article 19 of the NCAA Manual includes eight pages devoted to “enforcement” of 
rules violations. See NCAA, supra note 4, art. 19.01, at 319. Penalties, which range in 
severity, generally serve to hinder a school’s ability to compete athletically in the violat-
ing sport, and in some cases limit a school’s access to television and other NCAA-
arranged revenues. See id. art. 19.5.1–19.5.2, at 322–24. 
244 See supra notes 110–19 and accompanying text. 
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degrees for student-athletes, accessed via athletic scholarships, were res-
ponsive to competitive conditions and consumer demand.245 For example, 
schools attracting athletes with four-year scholarships tended to out-
compete those that did not offer four-year scholarships for the best incom-
ing talent.246 Meanwhile, prospective student-athletes reliably followed the 
lines of scholarship supply, as liberal rules pertaining to per sport scholar-
ship limits allowed schools to take on the expense of massive numbers of 
scholarship players in any one year, thus facilitating the rapid construction 
of competitive teams.247 In other words, access to bachelor’s degrees via 
athletic scholarships was considerable, and prospective college athletes 
could browse the market for the most competitive offers. 
With NCAA members looking to cut input costs,248 their institution of 
the challenged scholarship rules in the 1970s saw student-consumers lose 
this freedom. Today, NCAA schools, bound by the scholarship restrictions 
to which they horizontally agreed, can no longer meaningfully compete 
for athletes via the market for bachelor’s degrees.249 This has left athletes 
unable to find opportunities for more than one year of guaranteed or dis-
counted tuition.250 
A court’s decision to apply a quick look rule of reason follows from a 
plaintiff’s establishment of such obvious anticompetitive effects, those 
which are apparent when an effective horizontal agreement has made a 
product’s price less favorable to a plaintiff than it would have been from 
the operation of free market forces.251 Indeed, investigation into the rela-
                                                 
245 See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 110 (1984) (noting 
the Sherman Act’s command that price and supply be responsive to consumer prefe-
rence). 
246 See discussion supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
247 Byers points out, for example, the immediate success of the University of Pitts-
burgh’s football team in the mid-1970s, when the head coach brought on eighty-three 
new scholarship players in just one year, and from that group developed a nucleus that 
rose to dominance over the next four years. BYERS, supra note 22, at 228. 
248 See supra notes 228–31 and accompanying text. 
249 See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 3, at 191–94 (noting the evident function of 
NCAA scholarship rules to restrain inter-school competition for student-athletes via 
differentiation in scholarship offers). 
250 See, e.g., Hanlon, supra note 6, at 43–45 (decrying in particular the absence of 
bargaining power between student-athletes and their schools that stems from the one-year 
rule); see also Louis Hakim, The Student-Athlete vs. The Athlete Student: Has the Time 
Arrived for an Extended-Term Scholarship Contract?, 2 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 145, 166–69 
(2000). Hakim discusses the one-year rule’s effect of stressing athletic performance over 
academics, as student-athletes must generally devote more time to their sport than their 
schoolwork. 
251 Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998). 
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tive price of bachelor’s degrees before and after imposition of the 
NCAA’s scholarship restrictions, as well as inspection of the motives 
behind those restrictions, would help persuade a court that anticompetitive 
effects plague the scholarship athlete’s bachelor’s degree market. Where, 
for example, liberal scholarship rules once saw universities compete with 
one another to promise student-athletes tuition sufficient to last them 
through four years of college, a span of time sufficient to earn an under-
graduate degree, those same universities have since agreed to no longer 
compete in that manner.252 This has meant that on a yearly basis, athletes 
like Agnew risk losing the compensation they need to help them earn their 
degrees. Given these contrasting responses to consumer preference be-
tween pre- and post-scholarship restriction eras, a court could fairly decide 
that the anticompetitive effects of the NCAA’s one-year and per sport 
scholarship rules are sufficient to justify a quick look rule of reason analy-
sis. 
3. Procompetitive Justifications 
As indicated in Part III.A supra, a court, upon finding such obvious 
anticompetitive effects as to adopt the quick look approach to rule of rea-
son analysis, would proceed directly to an evaluation of the scholarship 
rules’ potential procompetitive effects.253 With a court able to find obvious 
anticompetitive effects in this case, the burden would shift to the NCAA to 
show a procompetitive rationale for the challenged scholarship rules, leav-
ing a court to determine whether the NCAA’s proffered evidence could 
sufficiently demonstrate that the scholarship restrictions enhance competi-
tion.254 At this point, if Board of Regents and Law—and more recently In 
re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litigation—are any indication, 
the NCAA would likely turn to its standby procompetitive defense of 
“competitive balance.”255 As it did in the aforementioned cases, the 
NCAA would argue that its challenged horizontal agreement, here the 
close regulation of the duration and quantity of athletic scholarships, en-
sures that schools with more resources cannot out-compete those of fewer 
means.256 This much is necessary, the NCAA has legitimately argued, 
                                                 
252 See supra Part I.B–C. 
253 See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
254 See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
255 See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117–20 (1984); Law 
134 F.3d at 1024; see also In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. 
Supp. 2d 1144, 1150–51 (W.D. Wash. 2005). 
256 See cases cited supra note 255. 
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because it “must be able to ensure some competitive equity between 
member institutions in order to produce a marketable product.”257 
Although it is noteworthy that the courts in both Board of Regents and 
Law found the NCAA to have offered no evidence whatsoever of support 
for “competitive equity” by its price-fixing schemes,258 it is of greater 
relevance that observations from the last forty years show the NCAA’s 
scholarship restrictions, along with other similar horizontal agreements, to 
have more likely hurt than helped competitive balance in college sports.259 
Beginning with the institution of athletic scholarship caps and the one-year 
rule in the 1970s, restrictions on athletic scholarships immediately pre-
vented ambitious coaches from accumulating talent in their football pro-
grams through sheer numbers.260 That is, with coaches no longer able to 
dole out as many scholarships as desired in a given year, thereby creating 
a massive pool of freshman talent from which the very best could be re-
tained,261 “catching up with ... traditional winners” possessing other “built-
in recruiting advantages” became considerably more difficult.262 By the 
time of the 1984 Board of Regents decision, the Supreme Court noted, 
although without referring specifically to scholarship rules, that the 
NCAA’s attempts to restrict inter-member competition in aid of encourag-
ing parity had been “strikingly unsuccessful,” as evinced by the emer-
gence of a “power elite” in high level college football.263 
Further, more recent evidence has pointed to similar conclusions. For 
example, observations have suggested that the NCAA’s revenue-sharing 
efforts—those intended to distribute athletically generated revenues from 
                                                 
257 Law, 134 F.3d at 1023–24. 
258 See cases cited supra note 255. 
259 See discussion supra Part II. 
260 See BYERS, supra note 22, at 228; see also supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
261 Despite NCAA-enforced caps on athletic scholarships per team, some Southeas-
tern Conference schools still use a modified form of this technique to gain a competitive 
advantage in football. The practice, known as “oversigning,” finds schools promising 
scholarships to incoming freshmen that exceed the team’s eighty-five scholarship maxi-
mum. Coaches, however, then fix this problem by refusing to renew the scholarships of 
older players they no longer want, thus bringing their teams into compliance with NCAA 
mandated scholarship limits by the beginning of the next school year. Stewart Mandel, 
SEC’s Postseason Dominance Killing Cyclical Theory of Sport: More Mail, SI.COM (Jan. 
13, 2011), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/stewart_mandel/01/11/Wednes 
day.bag/index.html. 
262 See BYERS, supra note 22, at 228. Professor Koch, writing in 1978, made a similar 
observation, noting that coaches operating big-time athletic programs believed that such 
restrictions allowed their programs’ prestige to attract recruits in an environment other-
wise unresponsive to consumer demand. See Koch & Leonard, supra note 27, at 235–36. 
263 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 118 (1984). 
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the most successful schools to their weaker counterparts—have evolved to 
appease its strongest members by limiting the funds they must share.264 
The NCAA’s acceptance of this imbalance between haves and have-nots, 
it is asserted, has arisen largely to “prevent the defection” of its most com-
petitive and best-supported institutions.265 
A closer look at college football, the sport that generates the greatest 
revenues for the NCAA’s most competitive members,266 does further 
damage to the NCAA’s potential procompetitive argument. In a study of 
NCAA attempts through 2001 to encourage “competitive balance” in 
college football by institutional change and rule promulgation, Professors 
Craig Depken and Dennis Wilson found that these changes most often 
came at the behest of influential “pressure groups,” the NCAA’s strongest 
athletic institutions, whose true intent was to increase the success of their 
programs at the expense of weaker members.267 The result of these initia-
tives, as suggested by statistical analysis, was the reduction of competitive 
balance in the NCAA’s most competitive football division,268 known to-
day as the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS).269 Seemingly consistent with 
that study’s conclusion is the list of FBS championship teams since the 
introduction of scholarship limitations in 1973.270 Of the twenty-two FBS 
programs to have earned a championship since 1973,271 sixteen appeared 
on Forbes.com’s list of college football’s twenty “most valuable teams” of 
2009.272 Further, a focus on more recent championship teams shows that 
of the fifteen FBS programs to have won at least one of the twenty cham-
pionships since 1992,273 thirteen appeared on the Forbes list. Although this 
seeming correlation between monetary value and consistent success is far 
from an airtight test for establishing the failure of scholarship regulations 
to ensure competitive balance in college football, that this relationship 
exists at all casts further doubt upon the NCAA’s ability to assert procom-
petitive results from those regulations. Instead, as much as ever, the Su-
                                                 
264 See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 3, at 194. 
265 Id. 
266 See NCAA, REVENUES AND EXPENSES, supra note 93, at 36. 
267 See Depken & Wilson, supra note 27, at 209. 
268 Id. 
269 Championship History, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.com/history/football/fbs (last vi-
sited Feb. 4, 2012). 
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272 Peter J. Schwartz, College Football’s Most Valuable Teams, FORBES.COM, (Dec. 
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preme Court’s 1984 observation in Board of Regents of the dominance of 
a college football “power elite”274 rings true. 
In contradiction to its own assertions,275 the NCAA’s attempts to en-
hance competitive balance via horizontal agreements among its members, 
whether by scholarship regulations or otherwise, appear to have consis-
tently failed. In light of this evidence, it seems unlikely that a court hear-
ing a bachelor’s degree-based complaint citing the anticompetitive effects 
of scholarship restrictions would identify any procompetitive effects aris-
ing from the NCAA’s one-year and per sport scholarship rules. Rather, 
with an accumulation of surface-level information suggesting no im-
provement in competitive balance within top-level college football, the 
NCAA sport involving more scholarship athletes than any other, the 
NCAA’s scholarship restrictions appear more and more likely to be little 
beyond their characterization in Agnew’s complaint: regulations function-
ing to maximize the price of a bachelor’s degree for college athletes, the-
reby serving the revenue building ends of the institutions offering them. 
CONCLUSION 
Mindful of the district court’s assertive dismissal of the plaintiffs’ 
complaint in Agnew v. NCAA,276 this Note recognizes that a Section I 
Sherman Act claim alleging illegal price fixing of bachelor’s degrees by 
the NCAA invites a steep uphill battle. In particular, the Agnew court is 
persuasive in its conclusion that a market for the sale of bachelor’s degrees 
cannot exist for scholarship athletes, this based on reasoning that even a 
guaranteed four-year scholarship would not ensure a student-athlete a 
degree.277 Further, the Agnew opinion is only the most recent in a grisly 
history of failed student-initiated antitrust suits against the NCAA dating 
back to the 1970s.278 
                                                 
274 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 118 n.62 (1984). 
275 See Depken & Wilson, supra note 27, at 198. 
276 Agnew v. NCAA, No. 1:11-cv-0293-JMS-MJD, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98744, at 
*29–30 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 1, 2011). 
277 Id. at *27–29. The author wonders if the Agnew court, or any other court evaluat-
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opportunity to earn bachelor’s degrees, as opposed to Agnew’s assertion of a market for 
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In the face of these obstacles, however, this Note concludes that Ag-
new has left future plaintiffs enough wiggle room to cite the price fixing of 
bachelor’s degrees in asserting that the NCAA’s one-year and per sport 
scholarship rules constitute an antitrust violation. First, Agnew was the 
latest in a recent line of cases to undertake rule of reason analysis in con-
fronting an antitrust suit against the NCAA.279 This approach suggests that 
in such a case, the NCAA’s traditional defense of upholding amateur-
ism280 does not apply. Moreover, with the quick look rule of reason afford-
ing plaintiffs a way to avoid the troublesome market analysis stage of the 
full blown rule of reason,281 a plaintiff able to convince a court to apply a 
quick look rule of reason could well find himself in the favorable position 
of forcing the NCAA to demonstrate the unlikely procompetitive effects of 
the scholarship restrictions.282 
That said, the path to persuade a court to adopt the quick look rule of 
reason could be rocky. The Agnew opinion offers no endorsement of its 
use, and a plaintiff would face the burden of demonstrating sufficient 
anticompetitive harm imposed by the targeted scholarship restrictions 
upon student-athletes seeking bachelor’s degrees.283 As this Note men-
tions, however, the commercially driven circumstances surrounding the 
inception of those restrictions,284 and the reduction of student freedom in 
seeking out the most favorable scholarship offer since the restrictions’ 
imposition,285 provide support for the notion that the targeted scholarship 
restrictions have had an anticompetitive effect sufficient to justify a quick 
look analysis. 
Ultimately, whether a court would find a Sherman Act violation to fol-
low from a bachelor’s degree-based price fixing claim is far from certain. 
This Note would assert, however, that given the circumstances of the for-
                                                 
279 See Baker III et al., supra note 176. 
280 See discussion supra notes 22–33 and accompanying text. 
281 See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998). In adopting a quick look 
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mation of the one-year and per sport scholarship rules, the effects on stu-
dent-athletes those rules have had, and the reasoning in those court opi-
nions that have eroded the NCAA’s traditional protected status from anti-
trust scrutiny, the issue is at least in question. 
AUTHOR’S NOTE 
In October, 2011, the NCAA’s Board of Directors enacted a proposal 
to permit Division I schools to offer multi-year scholarships to prospective 
student-athletes—a decision effectively undoing the one-year scholarship 
rule referenced in this Note.286 At the time of publication of this Note, 
however, popular protest among Division I schools had seen the fate of the 
new multi-year scholarship legislation left in question.287 Should a 5/8 
majority of Division I schools vote to override the new legislation in a 
February, 2012 on-line vote, the one-year rule would again take effect, and 
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